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RECENT DECISIONS

such accord as the common-law ruling prevails unless the accord
comes up to the specifications of the statute.
A. S.C.

CONTRACTS

-CONTRACTS

TRUSTS-TESTAMENTARY

FOR

BENEFIT

or

THIlR

PARTY-

DIsPosITIONs.-This is a proceeding by

an executor to render and settle an account. Decedent made a loan
of five hundred dollars, on collateral security, to her executor and his
wife, as evidenced by a note and an agreement. The agreement provided that in the event of decedent's death before satisfaction of the
debt, the note with the collateral security was to revert to the named
son of the executor and his wife. The evidence shows that decedent
had previously opened a savings account in her name in trust for said
son of the executor and his wife and on the date of the loan had withdrawn five hundred dollars from this account, which was presumably
the sum loaned to the executor and his wife the same day. Decedent
died before payment of the debt and the executor has purported to
indorse and deliver the note, together with the collateral security, to
his son without having made any effort to collect the sum due. Decedent's sole legatee objects to said transfer by reason of the admitted
failure of the executor to make any effort to collect the debt. Held,
objections sustained. The transfer of the note and the accompanying
collateral security to the son was improper and the executor was
guilty of culpable neglect in failing to collect payment on the note from
his co-maker, if not from himself, since the co-maker was jointly and
severally liable thereon' and proof shows resources ample for payment. In re McCabe's Estate, 176 Misc. 286, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 127
(1941).
The accountant's contention that the agreement constituted a contract for the benefit of a third person 2 and enforcible by such third
person 3 had no applicability under the present facts. 4 Contracts
made for the benefit of third persons are executed contracts, where
the promisee is unable to revoke or control the promisor in the full NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTs LAW §§ 55, 110. (See also, id. § 36, which
reads in part: "* * * (7) Where an instrument containing the words 'I promise
to pay' is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed to be jointly and
severally liable thereon.")

22 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs (Rev. ed. 1936) § 347; WHITNEY, CONTRAcTs
(3d ed. 1937) § 76.
3 Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639, 2 A. L. R. 1187 (1918);
Litchfield v. Flint, 104 N. Y. 543, 11 N. E. 58, 5 N. Y. St Rep. 800 (1887);
Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181, 47 Am. Rep. 20 (1884); Little v. Banks, 85
N. Y. 258, aff'g, 20 Hun 143 (1881); Barker v. Bradley, 42 N. Y. 316, 1 Am.
Rep. 521 (1870); Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
4 McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N. Y. 407, 24 N. E. (2d) 102 (1939), reargitment denied, 282 N. Y. 800, 27 N. E. (2d) 207 (1940).
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fillment of the promise.5 Such a beneficiary contract is entirely incompatible with attempts to make testamentary dispositions 1 and assumes that all three parties are alive.7 Since the gift did not take
effect as a completed and executed transfer to the executor's son
(donee), either legally or equitably, during the life of the decedent
(donor), it is a testamentary disposition and enforcible only when
made by a valid will." The test seems to be whether the donor intended 9 to create in the beneficiary rights in praesenti or rights in
futuro.

The tentative trust presumptively ' 0 created by the opening of
the savings account by the decedent did not become a fixed and absolute trust by reason of decedent's statement that she was making the
loan from the funds of the executor's son."1 Such statement is not
the unequivocal declaration required 12 to transfer tentative rights of
5 Ibid.; 2 WILISTON, CONTRACrS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 396 ("* * * the donee
beneficiary acquires a right at once upon the making of the contract and that
right becomes immediately indefeasible.").
6A testamentary disposition of property is one which is not to take effect
unless the grantor dies; nor until that event. Diefendorf v. Diefendorf, 8
N. Y. Supp. 617, 56 Hun 639 (1890), aff'd, 132 N. Y. 100, 30 N. E. 375 (1892) ;
cf. Ga Nun v. Palmer, 159 App. Div. 86, 144 N. Y. Supp. 457, 11 Mills 548
(1913) ; see also 28 C. J. 624, § 11(E) ; id. §43.
7 See note 4, supra.
8
DECMDENT EsTATE LAW § 21; Rankin v. Donovan, 46 App. Div. 225
(1899), aff'd, 166 N. Y. 626, 60 N. E. 1112 (1901); 28 C. J. 624, § 11(E);
id. 648, § 43(2).
9 Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451, 2 N. E. 464, 50 Am. Rep. 41 (1885);
Townsend v. Rackham, 143 N. Y. 516, 519, 38 N. E. 731 (1894); In re
Vaughan's Estate, 145 Misc. 332, 260 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1932); McCarthy v.
Pieret, 281 N. Y. 407, 24 N. E. (2d) 102 (1939), rearguinentdenied, 282 N. Y.
800, 27 N. E. (2d) 207 (1940).
10 The New York decisions are uniformly agreed that it necessitates more
than the mere opening of a trust account to establish conclusively an irrevocable
trust. Thus, in Mabie v. Bailey, 95 N. Y. 206, aff'g, 12 Daly 60, 16 W. Dig. 557
(1884), the court declares (at p. 210) : "The character of such a transaction, as
creating a trust, is not conclusively established by the mere fact of the deposit".
In Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421, 22 N. E. 940, 15 Am. St. Rep. 531, 6 L. R.
A. 403 (1889), the court writes (at p. 428): "No * * * trust * * * can be
implied from a mere deposit by one person in the name of another." See also
headnote to Cunningham v. Davenport, 147 N. Y. 43, 41 N. E. 412, 49 Am. St.
Rep. 641, 32 L. R. A. 373 (1895), cited in full in Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y.
112, 71 N. E. 748, 70 L. R. A. 711 (1904).
1 Cf. Tiber v. Heller, 173 Misc. 333, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 59 (1939) ; In re
Kelly's Will, 151 Misc. 277, 271 N. Y. Supp. 457 (1934) ; In re Mannix' Estate,
147 Misc. 479, 264 N. Y. Supp. 24 (1933).
12 Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 125, 71 N. E. 748, 70 L. R. A. 711
(1904), wherein VAN, J., writes: "A deposit by one person of his own money,
in his own name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an
irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust
merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his
lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the pass
book or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance,
the presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on
hand at the death of the depositor." (Italics mine.)
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a beneficiary into present vested rights. To accomplish such resultant effect, the depositor must complete "the gift in his lifetime,
either by acts sufficient to constitute a valid gift inter zdvos, or to
effect the erection of a present trust",13 thus necessitating such unambiguous conduct as plainly to imply that the depositor intended to
divest himself of his interest in the property and hold it thereafter
for the named beneficiary. The decision rests on the well-established
rule that a gift of property to take effect after the donor's death, the
donor in the meanwhile retaining control and dominion over the property, cannot be sustained since it is a testamentary disposition.' 4
The court has placed great reliance on the recent cases of In re
Vaughan's Estate 15 andMcCarthy v. Pieret,16 the latter case following the rule of Tovwmend v. Rackharn.17
M.F.

CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER

IN THE FIRST DEGREE-EVIDENCE-

TESTIMONY.-The defendants,
Strauss and Goldstein, were convicted of first degree murder under
the New York penal law.' The indictment charged that they "willfully and feloniously and of malice aforethought, killed Irving Feinstein by strangling him with a rope and setting fire to his body."
Abraham Reles, who admitted taking part in the crime, described a
sequence of events which led up to the death of the victim. The evidence showed a deliberate and premeditated plan to commit murder.
Reles admitted having committed perjury at a previous trial. Both
defendants appeal on the ground that the judge's charge to the jury
as to what was required by statute 2 as corroborative evidence of the
testimony of an accomplice, in order to convict the defendants constituted reversible error. The defendant, Strauss, further contends
that he was deprived of his constitutional rights 8 by being forced to
trial without being afforded a judicial inquiry and determination as
to his ability to comprehend the charge against him; to confer with
his counsel; and to make his defense. Held, conviction affirmed.
Although there were minor inaccuracies in the charge when it is conCORROBORATION

OF

ACCOMPLICE'S

13 WINGATE, S., in In re Vaughan's Estate, 145 Misc. 332, 260 N. Y. Supp.
197 (1932).
1 See note 6, supra.
1 145 Misc. 332, 260 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1932).
16 See note 4, supra. For a thorough discussion of this case see 53 HAv.
L. Rzv. 1060; 26 CoRN. L. Q. 130-3; 38 MIcH. L. REv. 900; 24 MINN. L. REV.
1009; 18 Ci-KENT REv. 417.
17 143 N. Y. 516, 38 N. E. 731 (1894).

1 N. Y. PENAL

LAW

§§ 1044, 1045.

2 N Y. CoDE oF Cans. PRoc. (1882)
3 U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1; N.

§ 399.
Y. CoxsT. art. I, § 6.

